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Ownership and Possession in the Early
Common Law
by

JOSHUA

C. TATE*

Of the two great legal systems produced by Western civilization, the
English common law is by far the younger. Nearly a thousand years
passed between the classical period of Roman law and the birth of English
law as a national institution. Many scholars have viewed the reign of
Henry I (d. 1189), the medieval English king most associated with legal
1
reform, as pivotal in the development of the common law. The English
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common law
*Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. I would like to thank Joseph
Biancalana, Paul Brand, Hamilton Bryson, Charles Donahue, Paul Freedman, Lisa Hasday,
Richard Helmholz, Jeffrey Kahn, Daniel Klerman, John Langbein, Maurizio Lupoi, Sharon
McAnear, Joseph McKnight, Matthew Mirow, William Nelson, Jonathan Rose, Jenia
Turner, Rose Villazor, James Whitman, Anders Winroth, Peter Winship, and those who
attended my presentations at the 2005 American Society for Legal History conference and
the 2006 American-Italian seminar on relations between the ius commune and English law
for their comments.
The following abbreviations and abbreviated citations are used in this article:
BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK (F.W. Maitland ed.) (1887)
Bracton BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (George E. Woodbine ed.
and Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968-77, repr. Buffalo, New York, 1997)
CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 18 vols., London: 1922CRR
BNB

Digest of Justinian. in CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS (Theodor Mommsen & Paul
Krueger eds., 1880-95)
JUSTINIAN'S INSTrrTUTES (Paul Krueger ed., Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.,
Inst.
1987)
Glanvill THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY
CALLED GLANVILL (G.D.G. Hall ed. and trans., 1965)
D.

Lectura Medieval English commentary to Justinian's Institutes, in FRANCIS DE ZULETA &
PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200 (1990),
8 SS Supp. Series
F. DE ZULETA ED., THE LIBER PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS (1927), 44 SS
LP
PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES, 1198-1212 (D.M. Stenton ed. 1948-67),
PKJ
67, 68, 83, 84 SS
RCR

PatrologiaLatina (Jacques-Paul Migne ed., 1844-55)
ROTULI CURIAE REGIS (F. Palgrave ed., 1835)

SS

Selden Society

PL

Liber Extra (Gregorian Decretals), in CORPUS lURIS CANONICI (Emil Friedberg
ed., 1879-81)
I. On the significance of Henry's reign see PAUL BRAND, "Multis Vigiliis Excogitatanl et
Inventam": Henry II and the Creation of the English Common Law," in THE MAKING OF THE
COMMON LAW 77 (1992). But see JOHN HUDSON, LAND, LAW AND LORDSHIP IN ANGLONORMAN ENGLAND 281 (1994) (arguing that the reforms of Henry II were "an acceleration of
administrative change, not an unprecedented leap forward").
X.
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compilation of Justinian's Digest.
While Henry I1was responsible for many specific innovations, the
most significant change of his reign was an expansion in the role of the
king's court.2 English kings had long been involved in rectifying failures
of seigniorial or local justice, but royal involvement in individual disputes
became routinized in the reign of Henry I. Ordinary disputes between
freeholders of all sorts were heard in the royal courts and were subject to
the same rules. By making royal justice widely available, Henry created a
national common law. Most historians agree that the English common law
is not a continuum stretching back into time immemorial; it is an institution that was born at a particular moment in time.
When the English common law came into existence, what we today
would call the civil law was experiencing a renaissance. Roman law had
been revived in the universities, and was being integrated with canon law
into the ius commune, the "common law" of Europe. The first recension of
Gratian's Decretum was completed in the mid-twelfth century, 4 providing
a conceptual framework for canon law that would serve as a basis for
future commentary. Papal decretals were being issued to ecclesiastical officials all over Europe, and an increasing number of legal cases were being
brought to the pope's court. 5 Henry H and his advisors could scarcely have
been unaware of this, as it was happening right under their noses. Many
papal decretals from the twelfth century are addressed to English bishops,
who were expected to apply the ius commune in local disputes.
Because the ius commune already had a long history when the
English common law came into being, historians have debated the extent
to which the English legal pioneers borrowed from the older system. Some
remedies, doctrines, and rules of the early English common law bear a
resemblance to certain features of Roman or canon law, which prompts the
question of whether the resemblance reflects conscious or unconscious
borrowing or simply coincidence. While it is rarely possible to answer this
question definitively, that has not stopped historians from trying.
One of the characteristic features of classical Roman law is the sharp
distinction it draws between ownership and possession.6 In rough terms,
ownership is title and possession is actual enjoyment. 7 The classical
Roman jurists were careful to distinguish between the two; Ulpian wrote
that "ownership has nothing in common with possession (nihil commune
2. See Joseph Biancalana, For Want of Justice: Legal Reforms of Henry II, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 433 (1988).
3. See id. at 434.
4. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 138-44 (2000).
5. See JANE E. SAYERS, PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE IN THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY 1198-

1254, at 1-5; WINROTH, supra note 4, at 145.
6. H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 259 (3d. ed. 1972).
7.

W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A

COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 62 (2d. ed. 1952, rev. F.H. Lawson).
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habet proprietascum possessione)."8 If the distinction between ownership
and possession can be found in the early common law, that might be a
sign that Roman ideas had some bearing on the development of the
English system.
The Latin word for possession, used by the Roman jurists, is possessio; ownership could be denoted by the words proprietas or dominium.
Early English writers did make use of these terms, especially the author of
9
the treatise called Bracton written in the early thirteenth century. But two
other terms are more common in the early records of the English royal
courts: ius, or right, and seisina, or seisin. The great English legal historian Frederic William Maitland thought that ius and seisina were roughly
0
equivalent to proprietas and possessio respectively.' Maitland distinguished between two important royal remedies for the recovery of real
property based on whether they protected ownership or possession. Right
was protected by "the proprietary action," the writ of right.' I By the late
twelfth century, seisin of land was protected by the assize of novel dis12
seisin, which Maitland called "a distinctly possessory action." Thus,
Maitland denoted the early actions of the common law by words derived
from the Latin proprietasand possessio, suggesting that English law, like
Roman law, clearly distinguished between these two concepts.
Maitland's assumption that seisin and right were merely the English
equivalents of possession and ownership has been forcefully challenged
by S.F.C. Milsom. Milsom does not view seisin and right as synonyms for
Roman possession and ownership. For Milsom, seisin and right must be
understood in the context of the lord-vassal relationship. A lord "seised"
his tenant of his land; thus "seisin" originally denoted the condition of
having been seised by a lord. 13 Right, on the other hand, "was not a sort
14
of ownership, but just the right to hold of the lord." According to this
view, seisin and right were not mutually exclusive concepts, for both
reflected the feudal bond between lord and tenant. In Milsom's view, the
notion that Roman law had some influence on the early English15 law of
property, other than supplying it with Latin words, is implausible.
Milsom's view of English law and its relationship with the ius commune is controversial. Other modem scholars have seen avenues for influence between the two systems. Mary Cheney, for example, has suggested,
that the assize of novel disseisin emerged in the context of an effort by the
church (specifically Archbishop Thomas Becket) to recover property that
8. D 41.2.12.1.
9. 2 SIR FREDERICK

POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, at 33 (2d. ed. 1968).
10. 2id.

II. 2 id. at62.
12. 2 id. at 47.
13. S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 39-40 (1976).
14. Id.at 71.
15. S.F.C. MILSoM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (2003).
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had been illegally alienated according to canon law. 1 6
Donald Sutherland, writing before Milsom's main work but after the
initial explication of Milsom's ideas, 17 argued that the assize may have
been partly inspired by the Roman interdict unde vi, which protected the
possessor of property from being put out by force.18
While Sutherland acknowledged differences between unde vi and
novel disseisin, he would not have quarreled with Maitland's characterization of the latter as a distinctly possessory action. Sutherland was sufficiently confident in the similarity between the Roman and English actions
to state that the "influence of Roman law thus seems to be clear." 19
However, Sutherland also acknowledged that the parallel between Roman
proprietas and possessio and English ius and seisina was not complete;

the latter concepts were more like points along a spectrum, whereas the
20
former were completely distinct.
Before one can ask whether the early common law was influenced
by concepts of ownership and possession in the ius commune, it is first
necessary to establish that these ideas were important not only to classical
Roman law, but to Roman law as it was understood in the twelfth century,
and to canon law. In a persuasive essay, Cheney has shown that the concepts of proprietasand possessio were invoked in ecclesiastical courts in
twelfth-century England. 2 1 No one, however, has yet examined the academic development of these ideas in England, chiefly in the Liber pauperum
of Vacarius, or in the early ordines devoted to matters of procedure.
These works are an important piece of the puzzle, and must be considered
as part of the ius commune of the late twelfth century.
Discussion to date about ownership and possession in the early common law has also been limited in another respect. Most of what has been
written on the subject has focused on what today we would call corporeal
interests in land. Scholars have not yet considered whether there was any
Roman or canon law influence on the advowson writs, or whether the
early common law of advowsons distinguished between ownership and
possession. As defined by Maitland, an advowson is "the right to present
a clerk to the bishop for institution as parson of some vacant church; the
bishop is bound to institute this presented clerk or else must show one of
some few good causes for a refusal." 22 Advowsons were property, and,
16. Mary Cheney, The Litigation Betveen John Marshal and Archbishop Thomas Becket
in 1164: A Pointer to the Origin of Novel Disseisin? in J.A. GuY & H.G. BEALE EDS., LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITISH HISTORY (1984) at 9, 25-26.

17. Sutherland cited Milsom's introduction to the revised edition of Pollock and
Maitland's History of English Law, published in 1968.
18. DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN 22-23 (1973).

19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. Mary Cheney, Possessio/proprietas in ecclesiastical courts in mid-twelfth century
England, in LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND NORMANDY: ESSAY IN
HONOUR OF SIR JAMES HOLT (George Gamett & John Hudson eds., 1994), at 245.

22. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 136.
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like land, they could be inherited or transferred from one person to another. Unlike land, however, advowsons were incorporeal, 2 3 and had the special characteristic that they could be exercised only when the church in
question became vacant, such as by the death or resignation of the parson.
The fact that an advowson could lay dormant for many years engendered
a great deal of litigation, much of it in the royal courts. Nevertheless, the
advowson writs have generally been ignored by those interested in the
relationship between the ius commune and the early common law.
This article attempts to fill in these gaps in the current literature in
order to arrive at a better understanding of whether, or to what extent, the
early common law distinguished between ownership and possession. The
article will argue that the basic distinction between ownership and possession was a part of the ius commune, both in theory and in practice, as it
was known in England in the latter half of the twelfth century. This distinction can arguably be seen in the advowson writs, and it cannot be
explained there, as it has in the land context, by reference to the feudal
relationship between lord and tenant. English right and seisin were not the
same as Roman ownership and possession, but those who created the
English common law might have been inspired in part by Roman and
canon law ideas.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I examines the role that the
concepts of ownership and possession played in the ius commune as it
would have been known in England in the second half of the twelfth century, taking into account Roman law texts and procedural ordines as well
as litigation in the ecclesiastical courts. Part II then enters the current
debate as to how English notions of right and seisin match up to Roman
or canon-law ideas of ownership and possession, focusing, as previous
scholarship has, on the assize of novel disseisin and the writ of right for
land. Moving beyond the current literature, Part HI considers how these
ideas might have played out in the advowson writs. Part IV concludes.
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN THE IUS COMMUNE
In order to see how ownership and possession were distinguished in
the ius commune around the time of Henry II, it is best to start with the
texts of Roman law that were known in England during that period. This
article will focus on two introductory texts that are known to have been
studied in England in the late twelfth century: Justinian's Institutes, which
were the subject of an English commentary circa 1200,24 and the Liber
Pauperum of Vacarius, a twelfth-century English collection of extracts
from the Digest and Code.25 The Liber Pauperum probably originated in
23 An advowson would eventually be classified as an "incorporeal hereditament," or "a
right issuing out of a thing corporate." 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1979, facsimile of 1st. ed., 1765-69), vol. 2, 20-21.
24. FRANCIS DE ZULETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND

AROUND 1200 (1990), 8 SS Supp. Series at I ff.
25. LP.
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Oxford, Northampton or Lincoln in the 1 170s or somewhat later, 26 and
the Institutes were most likely used as a companion to the Liber
Pauperum.27 Although the English commentary on the Institutes probably
dates somewhat later than Henry 11's reforms, it will also be discussed.
Although southern Britain was a part of the Roman Empire, little
trace of Roman law survived the Saxon invasions. 28 The Norman invasion
in 1066 did not bring about a revival of Roman law in England. 29 In the
mid-twelfth century, however, interest in Roman law among Englishmen
began to revive. Thomas Becket, the future Archbishop of Canterbury,
spent a year in Bologna in the 1140s. 3 0 Vacarius, who had studied in
Bologna at the time of the Four Doctors, arrived in England sometime in
the mid-I 140s, and began teaching Roman law soon thereafter, although
his teaching career was cut short when King Stephen banned the study of
Roman law in 1152.31 Stephen's prohibition did not last long, and by the
time of Henry II an increasing number of Englishmen were studying law
both in Bologna and in English schools. 32 Before the end of the twelfth
century, the Abbey of Peterborough owned a two-volume set of the entire
Corpus luris Civilis as well as a copy of the Institutes and copy of the
Summa of Placentinus. 33 While most of the royal justices in the twelfth
century may not have had Roman law training, 34 there were men in
England with such experience to whom they could have turned, had they
35
cared to learn how Roman law dealt with issues of property.
If King Henry's advisors did consult men learned in Roman law,
they would have learned about the difference between ownership and possession. An English student of Roman law in the late twelfth century
would almost certainly have been taught that there was a distinction
between proprietasand possessio. Ulpian's statement that "ownership has
nothing in common with possession" was included in the Liber
26. DE ZULETA & STEIN, supra note 24, at xxxiii, xxxvii.
27. Because the Liber Pauperum does not excerpt passages from the Institutes, one may
surmise that the former was meant to complement the latter. The purpose of the Liber

to allow students to advance from the Institutes to writings contained in the
Digest and Code. De Zuleta, 44 SS at li.
Pauperum was

28. See W. Senior, Roman Law in England Before Vacarius, 46 LAW Q. REV. 191, 19192 (1930); Ralph V. Turner, Roman Law in England Before the Time of Bracton, 15 J. BRIT.

1, 1(1975).
29. See Turner, supra note 28, at 2.

STUD.

30.
31.

DE ZULETA & STEIN, supra

note 24, at xxii.
viii, 22, in

JOHN OF SALISBURY, Policraticus,

THE STATEMAN'S BOOK OF JOHN OF

(John Dickinson ed. and trans. 1963); Turner, supra note 28, at 6.
32. Turner, supra note 28, at 7.

SALISBURY

33. W. Senior, Roman Law Mss. in England, 47

LAW

Q.

REV.

337, 337 (1931).

34. Turner, supra note 28, at 23.
35. See Eleanor Rathbone, Roman Law in the Anglo-Norman Realm, I I STUDIA GRATIANA
255, 263 (1967) (finding "evidence of some degree of familiarity with the principles and doctrines of Roman law in a fairly wide stratum of the educated class in England about 1180 and
of a marked infiltration incourt and council by men with specialist knowledge").
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Pauperum.36 Ownership and possession were acquired and retained in different ways, and were protected by different remedies.
The course books of Roman law used in twelfth-century England do
not give a formal definition of ownership, but they give considerable
attention to how it was acquired. The Institutes list several different "natural" modes of acquiring ownership, including the taking of wild animals
(occupatio),37 the finding of gem-stones (inventio),38 and the making of a
39
new thing from someone else's materials (specificatio). Delivery (tradi40
tio) was also listed as a "natural" mode of acquiring ownership. In order
to be a
had
there
however,
for ownership to be transferred by delivery,
sufficient causa, such as gift, dowry, or sale. 41 In the case of sale, the
buyer had to pay the price or otherwise satisfy the seller in order for ownership to pass, unless the sale was made on credit. 42 Inheritance was not
but was a separate category,
treated as a means of acquiring ownership,
43
treated in a different book of the Institutes.
In addition to these "natural" modes of acquiring ownership, the
sources also describe the "civil" modes of usucapion (usucapio) and longterm possession (longi temporispossessio). Property could be acquired by
these modes when it was possessed in good faith for a fixed period of
time, three years for movables under usucapio and ten or twenty years for
immovables under longi temporis possessio (ten years inter praesentes,
twenty years inter absentes).44 According to the English commentary on
the Institutes, the possession had to be just at the outset and for an acceptable cause, "one as a result of which ownership is normally transferred,
such as sale, barter and the like." 45 However, the commentary also suggests that things possessed in bad faith could be acquired in "not less than
46
thirty years."
Ownership was protected by the ancient action of rei vindicatio, an
action that applied to all movable property as well as land.47 The rei vin36. D. 41.2.12.1 (LP 7.17). See also D. 41.2.17.1 (LP 7.17) (explaining that one can lose
possession by intent alone, but ownership can only be lost by an act such as delivery).
37. Inst. 2.1.12 and Lectura gloss to 2.1.17.
38. Inst. 2.1.18 and Lectura gloss.

39. Inst. 2.1.25 and Lectura gloss to 2.1.27.
40. Inst. 2.1.40.
41. ld. 2.1.41.

42. Id.
43. Id. 3. lff.
44. Id.2.6.pr. The three-year period for movables was a reform of Justinian; classical law
had provided a one-year usucapion period for movables and two years for immovables. See id.
45. distinguiturcausa ex qua solet dominium transferri, Puta ex emptione, permutatione
etc. similibus. Distinguitur etiam initium, ut sit iustum. Lectura gloss to 2.6.pr. (trans.
Francis de Zuleta & Peter Stein). This allowed property to be acquired in good faith and by

normal means from a nonowner, which was not possible under the "natural" means of
acquiring ownership.
46. Mala fide uero possessa non minus xxx. annorum spatio adquiruntur. Id.
47. D. 6.1.1 (LP 3.27).
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dicatio was an in rein action, which meant that the defendant did not need
to be obliged to the plaintiff as in an in personam action. 48 The focus of
the action was on the plaintiff's right rather than the defendant's wrong,
and the plaintiff did not have to show that the defendant was bound under
the law of contract or delict to hand over the property. The action could be
brought against a defendant who possessed the thing or had fraudulently
ceased to possess it. 49 There was no requirement that the defendant have
some relationship with the plaintiff, so long as he had a relationship with
the thing. As the English commentary on the Institutes put it, "in an action
in rem we seek what is ours, and one's own thing is owed to no one." 50
Like ownership, possession is left undefined in the sources of
Roman law considered in this chapter, but the jurist Paul does offer an
etymology: he says that the origin is from sedibus (seat) and positio (position) because there is a natural holding by the one who stands on a
thing. 5' This etymology suggests that physical control was understood to
be an essential type of possession. Possession was acquired corpore et
animo, both physically and mentally. 52 Physically controlling a thing
could certainly involve the possession of it, even if physical control was
not always necessary.
Only corporeal things could be possessed in the full sense. 53 The
Roman sources do, however, acknowledge a kind of possession of incorporeal rights. Hence the concept of quasi possessio, a state that could be
achieved by the exercise of a right such as a servitude. 54 Two key texts on
quasi-possession appear in the Liber Pauperum,55 and the term quasi possessiones appears in the English commentary on the Institutes in a passage
on possessory remedies. 56
Possession was protected by interdicts, which were originally forms
or sets of words used by the praetor to order or prohibit.5 7 Gaius, in a passage included in the Liber Pauperum, wrote that one who contemplated
suing for a thing would be better off suing first by some interdict rather
than bringing the rei vindicatio, because it is far better to be in possession
48. Id.; Inst. 4.6.1.
49. D. 6.1.36.pr. (LP 3.27).
50. nota enim actione in rein persequimur quod nostrum est. Nemini enim sua res debetur. Lectura gloss to Inst. 4.6 (trans. Francis de Zuleta & Peter Stein).
51. D. 41.2.l.pr. (LP 7.17).
52. D. 41.2.3.1 (LP 7.17). A gloss on this rubric in the Liber Pauperum distinguishes
between civil and corporeal possession: the former can only be lost when someone strong
and powerful takes possession and I cannot repel him, while the latter can be lost simply
when another takes possession in his own name. LP gloss ad rubricam 7.17.
53. Id.

54. See GIUSEPPE BRINI, POSSESSO DELLE COSE E POSSESSO DEi DIRITTI NEL DIRITTO
ROMANO (1978 reprint of 1906 edition), 28-38; see also ENRICO FINZI, IL POSSESSO DEI
DIRITTI (1968 reprint of 1915 edition).
55. D. 8.2.20 (LP 3.39); 8.5.10 (LP 3.42).
56. Lectura gloss to Inst. 4.15.
57. Inst. 4.15.pr.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XLVIII

oneself and put the burden of being plaintiff on one's opponent. 58 For this
reason, the Institutes note, "there is often, in fact almost always, a hot dis59
pute as to possession itself."
The Institutes divide the possessory interdicts into three categories:
those for obtaining (adipiscendae), retaining (retinendae), and recovering
(recuperandae)possession. 60 The first category involved the situation
where someone else was in possession of property that belonged to someone with a right of inheritance; it awarded possession to someone who
never had it.61 The latter two categories, on the other hand, protected the
possessor of property against disturbance or dispossession, and were of
critical importance in the Roman law of property as presented in the
Institutes and Liber Pauperum. The two interdicts for retaining possession
were the interdict uti possidetis and the interdict utrubi. These interdicts,
the former applicable to land and the latter to movables, served to decide
which of two parties possessed the property in dispute and thereby determined which would be the plaintiff and which the defendant in a rei vindicatio, for, "[w]ithout first identifying the possessor, it is impossible to
begin the vindication." 62 In the classical period, the Institutes explain, the
winner in uti possidetis was
the party in possession at the date of the interdict itself, as long as his possession
had not been obtained from his opponent by force, stealth or license. It was irrelevant that the possessor had forcibly driven out a third party, had secretly
usurped a third party's possession, or had obtained a third party's license to possess. With utrubi the winner was the one who had possessed for the greater part
of the year, not counting possession obtained from the opponent by force, stealth,
63
or license.

Justinian harmonized the working of the two interdicts, so that the winner, for
both land and movables, was the party who possessed when issue was joined,
"still discounting possession obtained from the opponent by force, stealth, or
license." 64 It was irrelevant whether the possession was just or unjust, for
58. D. 6.1.24 (LP 3.27) (Is qui destinavit rem petere animadvertere debet, an aliquo
interdicto posit nanciscipossessionem, quia longe commodius est ipsum possidere et adversarium ad onera petitoriscompellere quam alio possidente petere.)
59. Inst. 4.15.4 (plerumque et fere semper ingens existit contentio de ipsa possessione)
(trans. Peter Birks & Grant McLeod).
60. Inst. 4.15.2.
61. Inst. 4.15.3.
62. . . . namque nisi ante exploratum fuerit, utrius eorum possessio sit, non potest petitoria actio institui, quia et civilis et naturalis ratiofacit, ut alius possideat, alius a possidente
petat. Inst. 4.15.4 (trans. Birks & McLeod).
63. ... uti possidetis interdicto is vincebat, qui interdicti tempore possidebat, si modo nec
vi nec clam nec precarionanctusfuerat ab adversariopossessionem, etiamsi alium vi expulerit aut clam abripuerit alienam possessionem aut precario rogaverat aliquem, ut sibi possidere liceret: utrubi vero interdicto is vincebat, qui maiore parte eius anni nec vi nec clam
nec precario ab adversariopossidebat.Inst. 4.15.4a. (trans. Birks & McLeod).
64. hodie tamen aliter observatur: nam utriusque interdicti potestas quantum ad possessionem pertinet exaequata est, ut ille vincat et in re soli et in re mobile, qui possessionem
nec vi nec clam nec precario ab adversario litis contestationis tempore detinet. Id. (trans.
Birks & McLeod).

2006

OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN THE EARLY COMMON LAW

every possessor had a greater right than one who did not possess. 65
Both utrubi and uti possidetis were formulated as actions preventing
the use of force. 66 In uti possidetis, the more important of the two actions,
the praetor issued the following order to the parties: "I forbid force to be
used to prevent him of you two who is at present in faultless possession of
the disputed building from possessing it as he present does." 6 7 The purpose of the interdict was to protect the possession of the one whom the
praetor decided was the preferred possessor of the land.68 The formulation
of the interdict, however, allowed for two possibilities: it could be a double action in which both parties claimed possession, or it could be a simple action brought against a disturber who did not claim to possess. 69 In
the writings of the early Continental glossators, the interdict was understood primarily as a double action, but they allowed that the dispute over
possession could be only implicit and follow from the behavior of the disturber. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, Azo envisaged two
kinds of interdict uti possidetis: one intended to settle a dispute over possession, and the other to sanction a simple disturbance. 70
An examination of the English Roman law texts from the late twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries shows that, while uti possidetis was understood as a double action, it was also seen as a means of preventing the use
of force. The English commentary on the Institutes gives an explanation
very similar to that contained in the Institutes itself:
In [the interdict uti possidetis] the winner is the one who was in possession at the
time of the interdict, and it applies to the land.... Since the question of the legal
right of possession is of the utmost importance, it is necessary, in proceedings of
this kind, for it to be clear which party should be called plaintiff and which
defendant. But since usually the party in possession is in the better position, in
interdicts of this kind there is usually the greatest dispute between the parties. For
each of them claims that he is in possession, and since each of them appears to be
both plaintiff and defendant, interdicts of this kind are, as described later, called
7
double, since the parties seem to litigate in two ways. I

A gloss on the relevant rubric in the Liber Pauperum, on the other hand,
65. D. 43.17.2 (LP 8.14).
66. Id.; D.43.31.1 (LP 8.28).
67. Ait praetor: 'Uti eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab
altero possidetis, quo minus ita possideatis, vim fieri veto.' D. 43.17. l.pr. (LP 8.14) (trans.
Fritz Schulz). See FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW § 781 (1951).

68. D. 43.17.1.1 (LP 8.14).
69. LUCIEN MASMEJAN,
MEDIEVAL

(XIIIE-XVE

LA PROTECTION POSSESSOIRE EN DROIT ROMANO-CANONIQUE

SIECLES)

261 (1990).

70. Id. at 261-62.
7 1. hoc interdicto uincit ille qui tempore interdicti possidebat, et competit pro rebus soli.
...Sed quia maxima oritur questio de iure possessionis, ideo necessarium est huiusmodi
ordinari ut expressum sit uter agens et uter reus dici debeat. Sed quia frequenter melior
solet esse pars possidentis, circa huiusmodi interdicta maxima inter partes solete esse de
possessione contentio; uterque namque se possidere defendit. unde uterque actor et uterque
defensor esse uidetur unde etiam, ut in sequenti habetur, duplicia dicuntur huiusmodi interdicta, quia duplicia uidentur partes agere. Lectura gloss to Inst. 4.15.4 (trans. Francis de

Zuleta & Peter Stein).
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states that the interdict was "for retaining possession lost secretly," but
was also "a prohibition by which the possessor prevented his adversary
from using force to possess." 72 The interdict was "offered on account of
force," but it was on account of "force of repulsion," whereas the interdict
73
unde vi (discussed below) was on account of "force of revenge." Thus,
both the idea of uti possidetis as a double action and the notion of the
interdict as a remedy against force were part of the English understanding
of Roman law in the late twelfth century.
The remedy for recovering possession was the interdict unde vi, by
which the person who was forcibly ejected could recover possession from
the ejector.74 The Institutes make clear that the ejector was compelled to
restore possession to the dispossessed plaintiff "even if he himself
acquired possession from the violent ejector by force, stealth, or
license." 75 The interdict applied only to eviction by force from land and
76
buildings, and not to the loss of movables. A plaintiff who had not
acquired possession corpore or anino could not bring the interdict, for the
interdict protected only one who had possession and lost it, not one who
77
was simply not admitted to possession. The Liber Pauperum contains
several extracts relating to unde vi, and the action would have been known
to Englishmen who studied Roman law in the late twelfth century.
The Roman possessory interdicts all share a common assumption:
that a plaintiff seeking to recover property should claim possession first
78
before any further proceedings take place. A plaintiff who lost a suit
under one of the interdicts could subsequently bring a rei vindicatio. The
possessory action was meant to be heard first, but it was not necessarily
the final word.
The Roman possessory interdicts would eventually find counterparts
in canon law. By the end of the twelfth century, the canonists would
evolve an action similar to the Roman interdict unde vi that could be
79
brought by a clerk who was violently ejected from his benefice. In time,
this canon-law action would be generalized into the actio spolii, which
80
was eventually available to laymen as well as clerks. Maitland believed
assize of novel
English
the
for
inspiration
the
was
spolii
that the actio
72. Est aUtem retinende possessionis clam perdite, est etiam prohibitorium quo possessor
aduersarium ne sibi possidendi uis fiat proh(ibet). LP gloss ad rubricam 8.14 (Uti
possidetis.)
73. Sed hoc interdictum propter uim proditum est; sed illud supra ad uim ulciscendam,
hoc autem ad propulsandam pertinet.

74. D. 43.16.1 (LP 8.12).
75. ". . . per quod is qui deiecit cogitur ei restituere possessionem, licet is ab eo qui vi
deiecit vi vel clam vel precario possidebat." Inst. 4.15.6.

76. D. 43.16.1.3 (LP 8.12).
77. D. 43.16.1.26 (LP 8.12).

78. D. 6.1.24 (LP 3.27).
79. FRANCESCO RUFFINI,
reprint 1972 (1889).

L'ACTIO SPOLII: STUDIO STORICO-GIURIDICO

80. MASMEJAN, supra note 69, at 187-9 1.

329, 337 (photo.
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disseisin, because both actions protected the possessor of property against
despoliation regardless of whether he had a claim to ownership.81
Maitland also attached some significance to the phrase "iniuste et sine
iudicio" in the assize of novel disseisin, which he claimed pointed to
canon law origins. 82 Maitland's view was adopted by Holdsworth in his
multivolume history of English law. 83 Maitland was careful to point out
that, although the assize of novel disseisin was influenced by the canon
law, it was not identical to the canon law action. 84 The link he drew
between the two institutions, however, was strong.
Maitland's theory remained unchallenged for decades, until H.G.
Richardson and G.O. Sayles argued that the assize of novel disseisin cannot have based directly on the actio spolii. The canon law actio spolii had
not evolved by 1166 in time to influence the assize: in fact, the term actio
spolii was not even known in the Middle Ages. 85 The medieval term was
condictio ex canone Redintegranda, referring to the first word of two
canons in Gratian's Decretum.86 As far as has been determined, the
canonists' condictio ex canone Redintegranda was first mentioned by
Sicard of Cremona in his Summa written around I 179-82,87 several years
after the development of the assize of novel disseisin. Even at this stage, it
is not clear exactly what the condictio protected, or who could avail themselves of it.88 The canonists only began to elaborate on the significance of
the condictio ex canone Redintegranda after 1215, when a decree of
Innocent III forced the commentators to explain the difference between
redintegrandaand the action apparently created by the pope. 89
To say that the actio spolii was not in existence in the mid-twelfth
century, however, does not mean that the basic idea behind it was
unknown to canon law at that time. Since the days of the False Decretals,
which were composed in the ninth century by an unknown author or
authors, the canon law had recognized two principles regarding bishops:
whoever has been despoiled must be restored, and a bishop who has been
despoiled must have his property restored before answering charges. 90
81. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 135; 2 id. at48 n. 1.
82. Id. at 48 n. I.
83. 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 204 (3d. ed. 1923).
84. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 135.
85. H.G. RICHARDSON AND G.O. SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT
UNDER HENRY III, AT CXXViii-CXXiX (1941).
86. C.2 q. I c.l-6 and C.3 q. I c. 1-6.
87. RUFFINI, supra note 79, at 329, 337.
88. Not until the end of the fourteenth century would it be finally settled that laymen as
well as churchmen could avail themselves of the condictio ex canone Redintegranda, see
MASMEJAN, supra note 69, at 198 (1990), and canonists would argue for centuries over
whether the action could be successfully brought against a third party who had received the
property in good faith.

89. Id. at 188-94.
90. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL,
at 388 (SS No. 77, 1959) (quoting RUFFINI, supra note 79, at 288).
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The forged papal letters stating these principles were collected in
Gratian's Decretum,9 1 copies of which would have been available in
England by 1166.92 Baron van Caenegem links these principles of the
canon law with the old Germanic idea of gewere, or "peaceful and actual
enjoyment of any right," and argues that the condictio ex canone
Redintegranda drew upon this older concept, expanding it to cover all
persons. 93 Yet the notion that possession must be protected against despoliation also has an obvious Roman law parallel.
By the l180s, a distinction between proprietary and possessory
actions appears in some of the canonistic ordines devoted to matters of
procedure. The Summa Quicumque vult of Johannes Bassianus, which
dates to around 1185, describes separate forms for actions in rem and possessory actions. 94 The in rem formula is explicitly compared to the Roman
rei vindicatio, and, as in Roman law, separate forms are given for actions
for recovering and retaining possession. The same is true of the Summa of
Ricardus Anglicus, and, according to Wahrmund's edition, the passage in
question appears in a version of the text that scholars now believe to have
been composed in England prior to 1190.95 In the late twelfth-century, an
Anglo-Norman school of canonists was producing a number of works
96
devoted to Roman and canonical procedure, and Ricardus' work should
be assigned to this category. Canonists were beginning to internalize property concepts from Roman law, and the existence of the distinction
between ownership and possession in the original ordo of Ricardus
Anglicus shows that the idea had made its way to England.
The distinction between ownership and possession is not only evident in
Roman and canon-law academic writings from the second half of the twelfth
century: it can also be seen in court cases from the same period. The evidence

91. C.2 q. 2;C.3 q. 1.
92. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 90, at 368 (listing Gratian's Decretum among books
acquired by Lincoln Cathedral circa 1150-58). The principles were also well-known through
the False Decretals themselves, which circulated in England as part of "Lanfranc's
Collection." Id. at 389 n. I.
93. Id. at 388-89.
94. 4 LUDWIG WAHRMUND ED., QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ROMISCH-KANONISCHEN
PROCESSES IM MITrELALTER 4-5 (1925). On the date see LINDA FOWLER-MAGERL, ORDINES
TO THE
IUDICIARII AND LIBELLI DE ORDINE IUDICIORUM (FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE TWELFTH

END OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY) 63 (1994).
95. Wabrmund used Vat. lat. 2691, fol. 49r-58v, as one of the manuscripts for his edition.
This manuscript is taken to represent the English version of Ricardus' ordo. See http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/1 140q-r.htm. Wahrmund gives several alternate readings from this
manuscript in the passage devoted to ownership and possession. 2:3 LUDWIG WAHRMUND
ED., QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER ROMISCH-KANONISCHEN PROCESSES IM MITTELALTER, 4-6
(1915). The alternate readings do not affect the gist of the passage, which describes separate
remedies for ownership and possession, compares the in rem remedy to the Roman vindicatio, and distinguishes between actions for recovering and retaining possession.
96. See Stephan Kuttner & Eleanor Rathbone, Anglo-Norman Canonists of the Twelfth
Century: An Introductory Study, 7 TRADITIO 279, 290 (1949-51).
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has been discussed by Mary Cheney and others, 97 but it is worth reviewing
here. Court cases and papal decretals show that ideas being discussed among
scholars were also playing out in practice, in particular the notion that a possessory suit should be brought first before claiming ownership.
A priest claiming a benefice before an ecclesiastical tribunal was
likely to sue first for possession before claiming ownership. In a lawsuit
held in the court of Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury, who died in
1161, Alan of N. sought a benefice of which he had allegedly been
despoiled. A letter to the pope written by John of Salisbury on behalf of
Archbishop Theobald says that Alan initially sued by a possessory (possessorio) action, but when this claim appeared to be barred by prior judgment, he dropped his possessory suit and brought a proprietary claim
(petitorium), arguing that he had been the rector in the time of an earlier
bishop and had proven this in court.98 The discussion of the case distinguishes clearly between possessory and proprietary claims, and shows
that a plaintiff was likely to start with a possessory claim.
Another case heard during Theobald's reign shows that the disposition of a possessory action was understood not to preclude a subsequent
proprietary action. A certain Peter claimed possession of lands that pertained to the archbishop's manor of Wimbledon and Barns. The King
ordered that the dispute was to be heard in the archbishop's court. Peter
claimed seisin on the basis that his father possessed the land on the day
Henry I died, but without mentioning inheritance. Since Peter could offer
no proof that the land was held heritably, he was denied seisin, but the
question of right was reserved. 99 The fact that Peter was told that he could
bring a subsequent action concerning the right suggests that the possessory suit was considered to be preliminary in nature.
The canon-law rule that an individual who was despoiled of a
benefice had to be restored to possession before further proceedings took
place, which would become the basis for the condictio ex canone
Redintegranda, was known in England in the second half of the twelfth
century. For example, a decretal of Pope Eugenius dated Feb. 5, 1152
orders the bishop of Hereford to restore certain property to a certain
Henry, reserving the cause concerning the ownership (causa proprietatis)
for the monks. 100 Likewise, a decretal of Alexander III dating to the period 1164 to 1179 and addressed to the bishop of Worcester orders the
97. See Cheney, supra note 21; see also HUDSON, supra note I, at 104, 267 (discussing a
case recorded in a charter of Archbishop Theobald); Biancalana, supra note 2, at 500-01
(discussing this case and another from the same period).
98. "[O]misso iudicio possessorio, petitorium instituit asserens ecclesiam suam esse et se
personam eius a tempore Mauritii bonae memoriae Lond(oniensis) episcopi extitisse......
W.J. MILLOR, S.J. & H.E. BUTLER EDS., THE LETTERS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY (1986 ed., rev.
by C.N.L. Brooke) thereafter LETTERS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY], No. 72. For a discussion of
this case see Biancalana, supra note 2, at 501.
99. MARION GIBBS ED., EARLY CHARTERS OF THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,
LONDON No. 163 (1939).
100. E.O. BLAKE ED., LIBER ELIENSiS 352-53 (1962).
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restoration of a certain clerk to the possession of benefice from which he
had been despoiled; once possession has been restored, the rival clerk
may institute an action concerning the ownership.101
The idea that the question of possession should be decided first had
been a working assumption of the papal court since the I 140s, if not earlier.
For example, a decretal of Pope Eugenius III dated January 16, 1146 orders
the bishop of Angoulkme and Limoges to put certain clerks back into possession (in possessione) of a church, allowing them to bring an action con02
cerning the ownership (causam de proprietate).1 A similar order was
given to the bishop of Perigord in September of 1146.103 These decretals
use the technical terms of Roman law, now part of the ius commune.
Notions of proprietas and possessio did not only affect churchmen:
they also affected powerful laymen who became involved in ecclesiastical
litigation. In the mid twelfth-century, Reginald earl of Cornwall became
involved in a dispute over the church of Hinton, of which the earl claimed
the advowson. In the case, recorded in a letter of Theobald to the pope
drafted by John of Salisbury, a clerk named Ernald claimed the church by
presentation of a certain knight. The earl, who had apparently dispossessed the clerk, was persuaded to grant restitution on condition that he
04
might be able to bring a proprietary claim (petitorium).' Laymen who
of posrestoration
a
that
sued in the church courts would have understood
not
did
If
they
ownership.
concerning
dispute
any
session had to precede
understand this in the beginning, the lesson would be taught to them by
the ecclesiastical court.
Reginald was the uncle of King Henry II, and, as Cheney explains,
the king was expected to understand the distinction between proprietary
and possessory suits. 10 5 In a dispute between the abbot of St. Vincent and
the bishop of Llandaff, the ecclesiastical judges decided to receive the
abbot's proof notwithstanding pending appeals to the pope and the king,
"both because it was only concerned with possession (super sola possessione fiebat) and because it was produced for the third time at great
expense and trouble." 106 The reference to sola possessione indicates that
possessory actions were considered to be distinct and preliminary; they
could be followed by a proprietary action. The king, to whom the report
was addressed, was expected to understand this.
The references in cases and papal decretals to proprietary and pos101. Hans-Eberhard Lobmarm ed., Collectio Wigorniensis 7.72, in 22 ZEITSCHRIFT DER
143-44 (1933).

SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, KANONISTISCHE ABTEILUNG

102. 180 PL, col. 1095 no. 72.
103. Id. col. 1153 no. 127 ("Facta autem restitutione, si clerici . .. de proprietate agere
voluerint . ..causa audiatur .... ).
104. LETTERS OF JOHN OF SALISBURY, supra note 98, no. 102.

105. Cheney, supra note 21, at 253.
106. A. CHEDEVILLE ED., LIBER CONTROVERSARIUM SANCTI VINCENTII CENOMANNENSIS
No. 251 (1968) (translation by Mary Cheney, supra note 21, at 250) ("turn quia super sola
possessionefiebat,turn quia jam tertio multis laboribuset sumptibus ipsius abbatis producta
fuerat").
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sessory actions suggests that Richardson and Sayles were too quick to dismiss the possibility of canon law influence on the assize of novel disseisin. Even if the condictio ex canone Redintegranda was not created

until the 1180s, it is clear that canon-law possessory actions were available in England to restore dispossessed persons to their property by the
I 150s if not earlier. Whether these actions were the inspiration for the
assize of novel disseisin is another question, but the fact that the condictio
was created after the assize should not be taken to rule out the possibility
of influence.
In her article on possessory and proprietary concepts in twelfth-century English ecclesiastical litigation, Cheney draws the conclusion that it
was the "example and pressure of the papal court" that spread notions of
proprietas and possessio among the English prelates.1 07 But this prompts
the question of how the distinction became part of the parlance of the
papal court. One suspects that the writings of the academic jurists had
some effect on the development of this distinction in practice. Some of the
pope's advisors might have had a background in Roman law. At the very
least, the development of possessory and proprietary ideas in practice was
consistent with the contemporary theoretical development of the same
ideas. As Cheney notes, "[t]here seems to be no doubt that the concept of
possession was revived as a result of the academic study of Roman Law
in the early twelfth century in Italy."108
The revived study of the Corpus luris Civilis had an impact on what
was happening in ecclesiastical courts. This leads us back to the question
of whether the revival of Roman law also had an impact on the formation
of the English common law, either directly or (more likely) indirectly
through the example of the ecclesiastical actions. To this question we will
now turn.
THE WRIT OF RIGHT FOR LAND AND THE ASSIZE OF
NOVEL DISSEISIN
In his seminal work on the early history of the common law,
Maitland identified the writ of right for land and the assize of novel disseisin as, respectively, the proprietary action and the possessory action. 109
Subsequent scholarship has focused on these two writs as possible evidence for-or against-a Roman or canon law influence on the early
English law of property. In order to evaluate whether the early common
law distinguished between ownership and possession, therefore, it is best
to start with these two writs.
The writ of right was one of the earliest writs developed during
Henry II's reign, and it had antecedents going back to the reign of
107. Cheney, supra note 21, at 252.
108. Id. at 247.
109. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 47, 62.
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William the Conqueror.110 The wording of the writ as it stood in the latter
part of Henry's reign is preserved in the treatise known as Glanvill, which
was written circa 1187-89.111 The writ commanded a particular lord to
"do full right without delay" with respect to a certain parcel of land which
A claimed to hold of the lord and of which B was deforcing A. 112 If the
would, "that I may hear
lord did not do this, the writ warned, the sheriff
3
no further complaint for default of right."11 The writ had to be directed
against the lord of whom the plaintiff claimed to hold, "not to anyone
1
else, not even to the chief lord." 14 If the lord failed to do right to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff could have the case removed to the county court by
1
could have the case
a procedure known as tolt.1 5 From there the plaintiff
11 6
transferred to the royal court by a writ of pone. The basic idea behind
to do justice to one of his tenants, the
the writ was that, when a lord failed
117
intervene.
to
right
the
had
king
The writ of right could involve a slow, cumbersome procedure. Once
the matter was removed into the king's court, the defendant had to be
summoned. If he failed to appear at the first summons, up to two addition18
al summonses would be issued. The defendant could also avail himself
that he was sick,
of up to three essoins, alleging (by a representative)
9
overseas, in the king's service, or on a pilgrimage.11 When the defendant
did appear, the plaintiff would state his claim and offer to prove it by his
who had to be
champion.1 20 The defendant could then vouch a warrantor,
12 1
or his
summoned and who could also essoin three times. The defendant
122
warrantor would then choose between battle and the grand assize.
This last element of the procedure accompanying the writ of rightthe election between battle and the grand assize-was a fairly recent innovation at the time Glanvill was written, the grand assize having been
introduced by the assize of Windsor in 1179.123 Prior to that date, all writs
110. See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 90, at 206-21, 413-24 (giving examples);

Biancalana, supra note 2, at 442-48.
111. The date and authorship of the treatise are uncertain. It is unlikely to have been written by the royal justiciar Rannulf Glanvill, as was once thought. Internal evidence suggests
that it was written between 29 November 1187 and 6 July 1189. See G.D.G. HALL,
Introductionto Glanvill.

112. Glanvill XII, 3 [trans. Hall].
113. Id. [trans. Hall].

114. Id. XII, 8 [trans. Hall].
115. Id. XII, 6-7; Biancalana, supranote 2, at 443.
116. Glanvill VI, 7.

117. Biancalana, supra note 2, at 466.
118. Glanvill I, 7.

119. Id. 111-29.
120. Id. IV, 6, p. 46. Glanvill refers to "probos homines," but the champion is usually a
single individual in the early plea rolls.
121. Id. I1 1-6.
122. Id.
123. J.H. Round, The Date of the GrandAssize, 31 ENG. HIST. REV. 268, 268-69 (1916).

2006

OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN THE EARLY COMMON LAW

of right were decided by battle, which, as Glanvill describes it, involved
six possible essoins, three for the defendant and three for his champion.1 24
The grand assize involved fewer essoins, but its procedure was scarcely
expeditious: four knights were summoned to elect twelve knights, who
were then summoned to decide the matter. 125 At any stage, one or more of
the knights might fail to show up, which would slow things down further.
The cumbersome nature of the writ of right, together with the
unseemliness of trial by battle, probably prompted the invention of the
assize of novel disseisin, the most important legal innovation of Henry
II's reign.1 26 Unlike the writ of right, the writ of novel disseisin was
addressed to the sheriff, not the plaintiff's lord. The earliest evidence for
the form of the writ comes from Glanvill. In the writ, the king informs the
sheriff of A's complaint that B "unjustly and without a judgment has disseised him of his free tenement in such-and-such a vill since my last voyage to Normandy." The king then orders the sheriff to restore the chattels
seized from the land and hold the tenement and the chattels in peace for a
specified period of time. The tenement would then be viewed by "twelve
free and lawful men of the neighbourhood," called the recognitors, who
would then be summoned to appear before the king or his justices at the
appointed time. B, or his bailiff, would also be attached to hear the recognition. 127 There were no essoins allowed and the assize could proceed
even if the defendant failed to appear.' 28
Maitland believed that the assize was created around 1166 by a royal
ordinance, possibly at the council held in Clarendon early that year.129
Beginning in 1166, the Pipe Rolls record amercements "for disseisin"
against "the king's assize" or "the king's writ."130 It is possible, however,
that the ordinance was made before 1166, possibly as early as 1155.131 It
has been suggested that the initial ordinance established only a "criminal"
offense, and the regular "civil" remedy developed later, perhaps soon
before the writ appears in Glanvill.132 Even the basic notion that the
assize was created by a formal act of legislation has been challenged.133
But the assize as it appears in Glanvill looks like a "deliberately co-ordinated design," and, since there is no evidence of a later enactment, the
124. Glanvill11, 3, p. 23.
125. Id. 11, 11-12, pp. 30-32.

126.
127.
128.
129.

See SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 35-36.
Glanvill XIII, 33.
Id. XIII, 38.
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 145.

130. Pipe Roll 12 Henry 11, 4, 7, 10, 14, 65.
131. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 7-8; see also DORIS M. STENTON, ENGLISH
JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHARTER

1066-1215, at 39

(1964).

132. S.F.C.
1981).
133. J.E.A.

MILSOM, HISTORICAL. FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
JOLLIPFE, ANGEVIN KINGSHIP

46-47 (1955).

138-39 (2d. ed.
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most likely inference is that Glanvill preserves the original form of the
assize from 1 155-66.134
In his study of the history of English writs from the Norman conquest to Glanvill, Baron van Caenegem stressed the continuity between
early writs issued by all the Norman kings before 1166 and the eventual
135
In these writs, the
development of the assize of novel disseisin.
property to other
disseised
restore
Norman kings ordered individuals to
king about the
the
to
complained
had
who
houses
religious
individuals or
disseisin. Lady Stenton has pointed out, however, that none of the writs
reprinted by van Caenegem was returnable: the king did not appoint a day
for the hearing of the action, indicate how it should be dealt with, or
and appear
instruct the recipient to "send men to view the land at issue
1 36
These points
when the case is heard with the summoners and the writ."
were all key features of the fully developed writ of novel disseisin.
Whether the assize of novel disseisin was the result of brilliant thinking throughout "many night watches," as the author of Bracton
believed,1 37 or simply a logical extension of a century-old royal tradition
of interfering in disputes over seisin, the dispute resolution mechanism
that it created was to have a powerful effect on subsequent English legal
history. The development of the assize of novel disseisin in the midtwelfth century was truly an eventful step forward for English law.
As discussed above, Maitland believed that the assize of novel disseisin was inspired by canon law and thus indirectly by the Roman interdict unde vi.138 Maitland suggested that the assize originated as a preliminary action to decide who would be the defendant in a subsequent action
of right. Maitland envisioned a contest between independent claimants of
to
a particular tenement, one of whom "turns out" the other in order 139
suit.
proprietary
the
in
defendant
the
being
of
secure the advantages
The claimants, in Maitland's account, need not have anything in common
other than a desire to occupy the same property. Maitland did not suggest
that the assize had any tenurial dimension.
Milsom's work in the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly
his Legal Framework of English Feudalism, has offered a very different
view of the origins of the assize of novel disseisin. Acknowledging that
the assize later came to be used to protect landowners against ordinary
wrongdoers, Milsom argues that its original purpose was to safeguard
140
Rather than view the plaintiff and
against abuses of seigniorial power.
134. SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 17-18; but see Robert C. Palmer, The Origins of
Property in England, 3 LAW & HiST. REV. 1, 22 (1985) (suggesting that the assize was "formalized into a standardized writ shortly before 1188").
135. VAN CAENEGEM, supranote 90, at 267-303, 444-464.
136. STENTON, supra note 13 1, at 33-34.
137. Bracton, f. 164b (trans. Samuel E. Thorne).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
139. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 46-47.
140. MILsOM, supranote 13, at 14.
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the defendant as random parties or neighbors involved in a dispute as
social equals, Milsom thinks that the defendant was likely to be the plaintiff's lord, called to task for disseising him without following the proper
procedures.141 The assize, according to Milsom, must be viewed within a
feudal framework.
Milsom also has a novel explanation for the writ of right. In
Milsom's view, the writ of right grew out of the settlement in 1153
between King Stephen and the future Henry II. According to Milsom,
chronicle evidence suggests that this settlement contained a general provision that those who were disinherited during the Anarchy should be
restored to the rights that they held under Henry 1.142 Milsom does not
think that the writ reflected a general royal policy of enforcing the customs of inheritance. 14 3 As an accidental consequence of the writ, however, issues that were formerly the sole province of the seigniorial courts
were taken to a new, abstract level. Before the writ of right was created,
Milsom explains, a decision by the lord to accept A's homage rather than
B's was final; there was no appeal. But the writ of right changed this, and
gave the descendants of B the power to undo the original decision by
invoking the authority of the king's court. 144
Robert Palmer has offered a somewhat different account of the writ
of right, which also connects the writ to the 1153 settlement. In Palmer's
view, the compromise protected each person who took land away from a
tenant during the anarchy, but when that person died the tenant who had
been dispossessed during the anarchy had the right to be accepted by the
lord. The writ of right was needed to allow the dispossesed tenant to make
his claim. 145 Palmer, who thinks that the assize of novel disseisin did not
become a private right of action until shortly before Glanvill, concurs
with Milsom that the early common-law remedies cannot be characterized
as proprietary or possessory in nature. 146
In his Legal Frameworkof English Feudalism,Milsom drew a useful
distinction between upward-looking claims--claims by a tenant against his
lord-and downward-looking claims, claims by a lord against his tenant. 147 Biancalana has shown that the writ of right could initially be used to
make either upward-looking claims or downward-looking claims. Under
Henry II, however, the writ of right came to include a clause that the plaintiff claimed to hold the land in question from the addressee.1 48 The writ
could no longer be brought by a lord against his tenant to force the tenant
141. Id. at 11.
142. Id. at 178.
143. MILSOM, supra note 132, at 128-29.

144. Id. at 129.
145. Robert C. Palmer, The Feudal Framework of English Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1143-

45(1981).
146. See Palmer, supra note 134, at 13, 22.
147. MILSOM, supra note 13, at 80-102.

148. Biancalana, supra note 2, at 445-49.
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to plead in the lord's court. Instead, it was a writ to be brought by a tenant
when someone else had got into the land under the lord's authority. The
writ was addressed to the lord, but the defendant was the rival tenant.
Under Milsom's explanation, the assize of novel disseisin also had
an upward-looking aspect, insofar as it was brought by the tenant against
the lord. But the tenant would only bring the assize after the lord had
already taken action against him by disseising him. Thus, the dispute as a
whole would have a downward-looking dimension: the lord wants to get
rid of the tenant and has taken action to dislodge him. Here the dispute is
between the tenant and his lord, not between the tenant and a third party.
It is possible, therefore, to explain the difference between the writ of right
and the assize of novel disseisin in terms of upward-looking and downward-looking claims: the former is an upward-looking claim by a tenant,
the latter is the tenant's reaction to a downward-looking claim by his lord.
Before the reforms of Henry II had their corrosive effect on the old
system of seigniorial justice, ordinary disputes over freehold land were
generally decided in the lord's court, not in the court of the king. Henry
1I's reforms gradually shifted much litigation into the royal courts, which
eventually became the sole venue for disputes regarding freehold land.
Milsom argues, however, that in order to understand the original purpose
of the assize of novel disseisin, it must be seen not through the prism of
later developments, but as it would have fit into a world where the lord's
court was still the dominant venue for land litigation. Created by men who
lived in this world, Milsom reasons, the assize of novel disseisin must have
been designed not to destroy the seigniorial court system, but to provide a
remedy for tenants in cases where its guidelines were being disregarded.
Milsom derives support for his understanding of the assize of novel disseisin partly from the wording of the assize and partly from the early plea
rolls. First, Milsom contends that the phrasing of the assize betrays its tenurial context. Under English law and custom, the lord could legally distrain a
tenant for failure to do the services due to his tenement, provided he obtained
a judgment against him in the seigniorial court: hence the requirement that
the disseisin be done without a judgment was not mere surplusage when
applied to the lord. 149 In Milsom's view, the reference to chattels also makes
the
perfect sense: since the lord would have taken them away in distraining
150
plaintiff, the sheriff could reasonably be told to have them put back.
As Milsom shows, the earliest plea rolls provide some examples of
cases where an assize of novel disseisin was brought by a tenant against
his lord. In some cases we find a defendant pleading that the assize ought
not to proceed because he lawfully distrained the plaintiffs by judgment in
15 1
In other cases, we find A bringhis court for failure to render services.
149. MILSOM, supra note 13, at 11.

150. id. at 12.
151. See 2 RCR 22-23 (Mich. 1199); 3 CRR 133 (Trin. 1204). In order for this plea to work,
the defendant had to produce his court; if he did not, judgment would be given for the plaintiff.
3 CRR 161-62 (Trin. 1204); 3 PKJ No. 932 (York 1204); MILsoM, supra note 13, at 13.
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ing a writ of novel disseisin against B concerning certain land and a writ
de homagio capiendo ("for taking homage") against B concerning land in
the same place. In Hilary term 1199, for example, Absalom son of
Absalom brought a writ de homagio capiendo against Bernard Grim concerning land in Cambridge.1 52 Later that year Absalom can be seen suing
the same defendant by an assize of novel disseisin concerning land in the
same county.1 53 We find Robert, son of Osbert, bringing an assize of
novel disseisin against Walter of Hereford concerning a free tenement in
Kingswood in 1198; five years later Robert de Kingswood, probably the
same Robert, is bringing a writ de homagio capiendo against the same
Walter concerning land in the same vill.154 In Michaelmas term 1201,
Robert de Heriet is bringing both the assize and a writ de homagio capiendo against Henry de Braibof.155 In all of these cases, the defendant is likely to have been the plaintiff's lord.
Despite these entries, Milsom concedes that the assize of novel disseisin was not brought exclusively by tenants against their lords, at least
by the time of Glanvill.156 In his discussion of purprestures, or encroachments, Glanvill discusses the possibility that the assize could be brought
against one's lord or one's neighbor.5 7 The existence of a few cases in
which the defendant is clearly the plaintiff's lord does not necessarily
prove that the lord was the usual defendant.
Milsom's arguments from the wording of the assize have been challenged. Paul Brand notes that, under Milsom's reading, the word "unjustly" in the phrase "unjustly and without a judgment" would be superfluous,
as any disseisin by a lord without a judgment would necessarily be
unjust.158 Brand believes that the phrase was "intended simply to ensure
that the assize was not used to remedy supposedly unjust judgments."' 59
As for the reference to putting back the chattels, Brand explains, a neighbor, as well as a lord, might take the chattels off of the land for purposes
of storage.1 60 Most importantly, nothing in the writ of novel disseisin
states that the plaintiff claims to hold the land of the defendant, as was the
case in the writ of right. 161 Brand considers it more likely that the assize
was concerned from the beginning with public order, and the limitation to
152. 1 CRR 86 (Hil. 1199).
153. I RCR 422 (Pas./Trin. 1199). This entry says Trim instead of Grim, but it is probably the same defendant. MiLSOM, supra note 13, at 18 n. 1.
154. I RCR 177 (Herts. 1198) (the assize); 2 CRR 259-60 (Trin. 1203) (the writ de
homagio capiendo).
155. 2 CRR 55, 60 (Mich. 1201). The second entry does not mention the land, but both
entries are from Hampshire.
156. MILSOM, supra note 13, at 13.
157. Glanvill IX, II (tenant against lord); id. IX, 13 (neighbor against neighbor).
158. PAUL BRAND, The Origins of English Land Law: Milsom and After, in THE MAKING
OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 1,at 223.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 222.
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free tenements marked the sphere of the king's competence. 162 Brand also
takes issue with Milsom's contention that the writ of right was meant only
to put back those dispossessed during the Anarchy, as there is no evidence
of this in the wording of the writ.163

Brand is not the only scholar to have taken issue with Milsom's view
of the early common law. Before Milsom published his book, his theory
was evaluated by Sutherland, who concluded that, although feudal lords
might often have been defendants in actions brought under the assize of
novel disseisin, we cannot assume that they were the only defendants that
Henry II and his advisors had in mind when they created it. "If feudal lords
were ... the usual disseisors against whom tenants needed new protection,

the designers of the assize made their work not one whit different on that
64
account, but cast it in the form of an action good against all the world."1
While some scholars since Milsom have treated the assize of novel
disseisin in the general context of Henry II's reforms, others have discussed the relationship of the assize in particular to concerns of the
church. In an essay published in the mid 1980s, Cheney argued that litigation between the royal courtier John Marshal and Archbishop Thomas
Becket in 1164 may help to explain the development of the assize of
novel disseisin.165 Under canon law, bishops and abbots had a duty to
recover lost possessions of their churches, and Archbishops Theobald and
Thomas Becket acted vigorously in the mid-twelfth century to recover
properties that allegedly belonged to the see of Canterbury, many of
which had been lost during the civil war of Stephen's reign. Around 1164,
Becket put John Marshal out of possession of one such estate, and litigation ensued to determine whether Marshal held of Archbishop Thomas or
the archbishop held the estate in demesne. Becket was victorious, for, as
162. Id. at 224.
163. Id. at 221.
164. SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 31. Even if the assize of novel disseisin and other
inventions of Henry 11's reign were intended to be a check on seigniorial courts, the imposition of such a check was itself a manifestation of central state authority and an attempt to
aggrandize the king's power vis-A-vis that of the intermediate lords. See HUDSON, supra note
1, at 254, 262-71; Biancalana, supra note 2, at 435-36. The phrasing of the writ of novel disseisin laid open the possibility, for deciding all land disputes in the king's court, and it is difficult to believe that the dramatic consequences that eventually ensued came as a complete
surprise to those who developed the assize. About ten years after the assize of novel disseisin was created, Henry II and his advisers created the assize of mon d'ancestor. This writ
was designed for situations where a lord prevented an heir from inheriting land of which his
ancestor had been seised. Biancalana, supra note 2, at 484-85. Like the assize of novel disseisin, the assize of mort d'ancestor used a jury of twelve men as its dispute resolution
mechanism. Guaranteeing the inheritability of freehold land, the resulting writ was frequently invoked by plaintiffs in the years to come. Another important innovation of the reign of
Henry II was the precipe writ of dower, which gave widows who had none of their dower a
remedy in the royal courts. Id. at 514. In several different contexts, Henry II and his advisers
intervened in matters that had previously been the province of the seigniorial courts, increasing the authority of the king and the royal courts while simultaneously strengthening the
hand of freeholders against intermediate lords.
165. Cheney, supra note 16.
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one of Becket's biographers pointed out, Marshal "had no right as the law
then stood (nullo iure munitus, quod tunc lex erat)."'166 The phrasing of
this comment is telling: "as the law then stood" implies that the law had
changed by the time Becket's biographer was writing.
The essence of Cheney's argument is that this 1164 litigation may
have been the immediate impetus behind the creation of the assize of novel
disseisin. It has always been puzzling why the magnates of England passively accepted the infringement on their seigniorial jurisdiction that the
assize represented. The puzzle is solved, however, if we can assume that
some of the magnates were tenants in John Marshal's position who wanted
a procedure to prevent churchmen from evicting them from their lands
without a judgment.167 Cheney notes that papal privileges granted during
the 1140s often contained a novel clause specifically authorizing English
bishops to recover lost church lands, many of which had fallen into lay
hands during the chaos of King Stephen's reign.1 68 If the church was more
likely to recover its lands during the years leading up to the assize of novel
disseisin by disseising lay tenants than vice versa, that might explain why
the assize did not meet with resistance from the great English barons.
Mike Macnair has offered a somewhat different explanation than
Cheney for the development of the assize of novel disseisin, but one
which also depends upon conflicts between churchmen and laymen over
property.1 69 Macnair points out that, prior to the development of the
assize, the main tool for deciding property disputes was the writ of right.
Trial by battle was unacceptable to the church as a means of dispute resolution. The church preferred proof by documents and witnesses in a
church court, but this was unacceptable to the king and the laymen
involved in the disputes. Perhaps, then, the assize of novel disseisin, with
its trial by a jury of recognitors, emerged as a compromise between the
procedural needs of the church and the desire of laymen such as John
Marshal for an effective remedy. 170
166. Id. at 16-17 (trans. Cheney).
167. Id. at 24.
168. Cheney, supra note 16, at 19 (citing 2 PAPSTURKUNDEN IN ENGLAND (Walther

Holtzmann ed. 1935), nos. 54 (Salisbury), 57 (Chichester), 78 (Exeter, misdated 1153 for
1146)). The special emphasis on recovering lost property in these letters is probably related
to the chaos caused by King Stephen's reign, but the duty to recover lost possessions was an
ancient canonical duty "impressed upon each prelate at the time of his blessing or consecration." Id. At any time during the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, prelates would have sought
to recover land they had once possessed that had fallen into lay hands.
169. Mike Macnair, Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 537,

581-82 (1999).
170. If the assize rolls from the early thirteenth century are any indication, churchmen
were more likely to appear in novel disseisin cases as defendants than as plaintiffs. A survey
of assize records from six counties (Lincolnshire, Worcestershire, Yorkshire,
Gloucestershire, Warwickshire, Staffordshire) from the early years of Henry Ill's reign, edited by the Selden Society, revealed a total of 598 actions of novel disseisin. Of these, 98, or
16.39%, involved a member of the clergy either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, and 70, or
11.71%, involved a high-ranking clergyman such as an abbot, prior or bishop. Of the total
number of novel disseisin cases involving members of the clergy, 61, or 62.24%, were cases
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If the theories of Cheney and Macnair are correct, then there is a real
possibility of Roman or canon law influence on the assize of novel disseisin. If church prelates put pressure on the king and his advisers to create a new action, they might have drawn on ideas from the ius commune,
which they were applying in their courts. In particular, they might have
asked for something similar to the interdict unde vi, or another possessory
remedy being used in the church courts at the time.
Sutherland saw several similarities between the assize of novel disseisin and the interdict unde vi. 171 Both taught that it was a violation of
law to put out the possessor of property by force, it being a breach of the
peace. Both applied to land and property fixed to land, like buildings, but
not to movables. Both proscribed all force, not merely violence. To prevail at either the assize or the interdict, the plaintiff had to have been in
actual possession. A slave could not bring the interdict, nor could a villein
bring the assize. But the slave's master could bring the interdict if a third
party evicted the slave, just as the villein's lord could bring the assize if a
third party disseised the villein. Under either Roman law or English law,
the party who failed could bring a countersuit in which he might get the
land back. Finally, and most significantly, both the interdict and the assize
provided that the winner would get not only the land but the movable
property on it and the income the land had produced during the wrongful
occupancy, and both provided that the one dispossessed or disseised could
recover possession by suing the original ejector as sole defendant regardless of who currently possessed the land.
There were also differences between the assize and the interdict,
which Sutherland noted. 172 The assize provided that the disseisin had to
have occurred since some fixed event such as the king's last crossing to
Normandy, whereas the interdict had no such limitation. The assize applied
to certain incorporeal property such as rights of common pasture, and protected against nuisances, which the interdict did not. The interdict did not
incorporate a jury of twelve recognitors like the assize. Most crucial of all,
the assize did not borrow any of the technical language of Roman law.
Despite these dissimilarities, Sutherland reached the conclusion that
the interdict "guided the development of the assize." 173 Milsom could not
disagree more. In Milsom's view, the only way in which Roman law had
any "influence" on the early common law was in supplying it with the
in which a member of the clergy was being sued by a layman or laymen, 29, or 29.59%,
were cases in which a member of the clergy was suing a layman or laymen, and 8, or 8.16%,
were cases with members of the clergy on both sides. The figures are similar if one considers
only cases involving high-ranking clergymen: 45, or 64.29%, involved a high-ranking clergyman being sued by a layman or laymen, 29, or 27.14%, involved a high-ranking clergyman suing a layman or laymen, and the remaining 6, or 8.57%, were interclergy disputes.
Interestingly, of the actions brought against higher-ranking clergy, the clergy were successful in 30 actions and unsuccessful in only 7.
171. SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 22-23.
172. Id. at 23-24.
173. Id. at 22.
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Latin language.1 74 If the assize really was directed initially against lords
who disseised their tenants without a judgment, then it is hard to draw a
parallel with the Roman interdict unde vi. The feudal relationship between
lord and tenant was uniquely medieval; there was no counterpart in
Roman law. Milsom's understanding of the assize does not admit the possibility of Roman influence.
So long as scholars focus their attention exclusively on the assize of
novel disseisin and the writ of right, it is unlikely that we will make much
headway toward understanding whether or how the early common law
incorporated concepts of ownership and possession from the ius commune.
If the distinction between these two writs can be explained in terms of the
tenurial direction of the dispute, as Milsom has, then it is hard to call one
possessory and the other proprietary. It is clear, however, that ideas of ownership and possession derived from the ius commune were being put into
practice in the ecclesiastical courts in England. The question is whether the
common-law property scheme as a whole, as opposed to two writs concerning land, bears a similarity to the scheme of the ius commune. To answer
that question it is necessary to look at the advowson writs.
THE ADVOWSON WRITS
Because no plea rolls or registers of writs survive from before 1194,
it is impossible to say precisely how many royal advowson writs were
available in the decades prior to Glanvill and what purposes they might
have served. Referring to an event that probably occurred around 115657, the cartulary of Darley Abbey records that twenty-four recognitors
swore that the church of St. Peter of Derby was in the donation of Hugh,
dean of Derby.176 What sort of writ resulted in this inquest is not specified; the fact that there were twenty-four recognitors suggests that it was
an ad hoc commission and not a regular writ. A record of litigation
between Battle Abbey and Hamo Peche concerning the church of
Thurlow raises the possibility that there might have been a writ that
referred to the aggressive action of the defendant in seizing the advowson.
According to the chronicler, the abbey commenced suit in both the royal
and the ecclesiastical court, the royal action based on "the violence of the
knight" (militis violentia), the ecclesiastical on "the intrusion of the clerk"
(clerici intrusione).177 The reference to violentia might be read as suggesting that the royal writ was somehow delictual in nature, but the chronicler may not have been thinking in a technical legal sense. Only from the
174. MILSOM, supra note 15, 1.

175. The discussion that follows focuses on the advowson writs created during the reign
of Henry II. It does not consider the writ of quare impedit, which was developed slightly
later. On the writ of quare impedit see Joshua C. Tate, The Origins of Quare Impedit, 25 J.
LEGAL HIST. 203 (2004).
176. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM ED., ENGLISH LAWSUITS FROM WILLIAM I TO RICHARD 1 (1991),

107 SS no. 365, p. 328.
177. Id. no. 445, p. 477.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XLVIII

time of Glanvill do we have a clear picture of what advowson remedies
were available in the royal courts.
Of the advowson writs described by Glanvill, the precipe writ of
right of advowson was no doubt the earliest to emerge, and the procedure
associated with the writ was rather cumbersome. Like the writ of right for
land, it involved a number of possible summonses and essoins, followed
by the waging of battle (or, after the assize of Windsor, by an election
78
between battle and the grand assize).1 A plaintiff who brought a writ of
right could hope to recover his advowson eventually, but not without considerable delay, unless the defendant defaulted.
In 1179, the same year that Henry II introduced the grand assize, the
Third Lateran Council added an additional complication for plaintiffs
seeking to recover advowsons by writ of right during a vacancy. This
Council was interpreted to give the bishop the authority to fill a benefice
179
A
when a dispute over the patronage lasted longer than six months.
dispute
advowson
an
decide
procedure was needed that could quickly
before the passage of time triggered the Council and gave the bishop the
prerogative to choose his preferred candidate. This may have been the
impetus for the assize of darrein presentment.
The assize of darrein presentment, like the assize of novel disseisin,
was one of several "recognitions" devised during the reign of Henry II, all
of which summoned a jury-like body called an "assize" of twelve free and
lawful men from a particular location to resolve a question or questions
specified in the writ. In this assize, the question was which patron present178. Glanvill 1, 7, 10; IV; 3-6. One unique element in the procedure for the writ of right
of advowson was the taking of the advowson into the king's hand in the event the defendant
exhausted all his essoins and still failed to appear. In such a case the sheriff would go to the
church and "in the presence of trustworthy men, announce that he has seized the presentation
of that church into the hand of the lord king." Id. IV, 5 (trans. Hall).
179. 3 Cone. Lat. c. 17 (1179) = X 3.38.3. Canon 17 of the Third Lateran Council originally provided that, when a legal controversy arose concerning the patronage and no decision was arrived at in two months, the bishop would automatically choose the parson himself. Although two months was the time limit expressed by the Council, later canonists
referred to three or four months, and four months was the limit referred to when the canon
was included in the Compilatio I and the Liber Extra. See PETER LANDAU, JUS PATRONATUS:
STUDIEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES PATRONATS iM DEKRETALENRECHT UND DER KANONISTIK DES

12. UND 13. JAHRHUNDERTS 171-72 (1975). More significantly, however, a decretal of

Alexander III directed to the bishops and archbishops of England specified that, in a controversy over the patronage, the bishop, six months after the vacancy occurred could himself
fill the church. X 3.3 8.22. Canonists offered different explanations for the contradiction
between the four-month period of the Council and the six-month period of the decretal. See
LANDAU, supra, at 172-73. However, the records of the English royal courts do not refer to
two different time limits. The plea rolls do sometimes report that a benefice was filled by the
bishop "by authority of the Council (auctoritate concilii)" because of a lapse of time. If the
time in question is specified, however, it is always said to be six months. See, e.g., 12 CRR
no. 379, p. 72 (Hil. 1225) (episcopus .. . quia ecclesia vacavit ultra sex menses, ipse auctoritate concilii illam contulit ... clerico suo); 14 CRR no. 81, p. 13 (Trin. 1230) (dominus
Cantuariensisper lapsum sex mensium contulit ei ecclesiam illam auctoritate concilii); 14
CRR no. 1227, p. 260 (... contulit ecclesiam illamn . .. ratione concilii post lapsum vi. men-

sium). The plea rolls leave the impression that the English church interpreted the Third
Lateran Council as establishing a six-month time limit for all patronage disputes.
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ed the last parson who was now dead to the church in a stated village,
which church was alleged to be vacant and of which church the plaintiff
claimed the advowson (quis advocatus presentavit ultimam personam que
obit ad ecclesiam de illa villa, que vacans est ut dicitur et unde N. clamat
advocationem).180 Thus the assize concerned the last presentation (ultima
presentatio), and has acquired the French-derived name of darrein presentment. The person or persons found to have presented the last parson recovered seisin of the advowson and were entitled to present the next parson.181
Because the earliest surviving reference to the assize of darrein prethat the assize
sentment dates to 1180,182 some scholars have assumed
183
Peter Landau,
was created in response to the Third Lateran Council.
however, has argued that the assize must have been created before
1176.184 A decretal of Alexander 1II, dating to the years 1173-76, ruled
that a clerk instituted in a church at the presentation of one who believed
himself patron ought not to lose his benefice when another recovers the
advowson in court, provided that the one who presented him "possessed
the right of patronage of the church" and did not merely "believe himself
85
to be patron without possessing the right."1 This rule is attributed to an
86
"English custom."1 In Landau's view, the distinction drawn by the decretal makes sense only if there was an action available in English law to
187
Landau thinks that the assize of
recover "possession" of an advowson.
darrein presentment was that action.
It is possible, therefore, that the assize was created before the Third
Lateran Council. The procedure of the assize, however, seems tailored to
solve the problem the Council created, and one may doubt whether the
earlier decretal of Alexander was in fact referring to the assize. While the
decision as to whether the patron possessed the fight of patronage might
well have turned on who presented the last parson, this determination
could have been made independently by the ecclesiastical court when the
benefice was claimed, without reference to a secular judgment. In other
words, the English custom in question might have been a custom of the
English ecclesiastical courts in cases where a layman had recovered the
advowson by writ of fight.
The assize of darrein presentment offered plaintiffs in advowson
180. Glanvill XIII, pp. 148-70; Xlii, 19, p. 161.
181. Id. X111, 20, p. 161.
182. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 90, at 332-33; English Lawsuits, 107 SS no. 518. An
1182 entry in the pipe rolls may also refer to the assize of darrein presentment, though it
could also refer to the grand assize. Pipe Roll 28 Henry the Second, 83 (1182) ('Radulfus
Ferrari is reddit compotum de 10 marcis pro respectu de recognitione cujusdam ecclesie'.).
183. See, e.g., VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 90, at 332.

184. LANDAU, supra note 179, 195-98.
185. Si vero tunc non possidebat ius patronatus, sed tantum credebatur esse patronus,
cur tamen non esset, nec possessionem patronatus haberet secundum consuetudinem
Anglicanarn poterit ab eadem ecclesia remnoveri. I Comp. 3.33.23 (emphasis added).

186. Id.
187. LANDAU, supra note 179, 196-98 n. 696.
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cases the possibility of a swifter judgment in comparison with the writ of
right. It also provided a fixed mode of dispute resolution in the form of a
jury drawn from the community, which undoubtedly attracted plaintiffs
who were disinclined to fight a battle and who thought that representatives drawn from the community would decide in their favor. In light of
these advantages, it is perhaps unsurprising that the assize of darrein presentment is the most common type of advowson action in the early plea
rolls. The assize, however, did not provide a final answer as to who had
the superior claim in the advowson; only the writ of right could offer the
successful plaintiff some assurance that the matter would not be taken up
again in the king's court.
If judgment was given against the defendant in the assize, the defendant could subsequently bring a writ of right. 188 Whether a party who lost
by writ of right could subsequently bring the assize was a closer question,
or at least the author of Glanvill pretended that it was for the sake of argument. The treatise writer suggested that, in principle, a plaintiff should be
able to bring the assize on the basis of his ancestor's seisin "notwithstanding anything that may have been decided about the right to present" (non
obstante aliquo quod factum sit super iure ipso presentandi).189 At the

same time, however, allowing the assize to be brought by the party who
lost the advowson by writ of right would mean that "it does not seem that
disputes which have once been ended by judgment in the court of the lord
king are firmly settled forever," 190 and judgment in the action on the right
ought to conclude the matter. Glanvill therefore concludes that a plaintiff
could prevail by the assize only if the defendant failed to object on the
basis of the earlier judgment; if the defendant argued, as he surely would,
that the plaintiff lost by judgment in the king's court whatever right he or
iis ancestors may have had, the plaintiff would lose his case and be liable
for amercement. 191 In other words, a party who lost by the assize could
subsequently bring the writ of right, but not vice versa. The assize, if it
was brought, had to come first.
Cases from the plea rolls show that an action of darrein presentment,
once concluded, could be followed by a writ of right. In Trinity term
1200, for example, John Chapel brought an assize of darrein presentment
against the abbot of Saint Augustine and the prior of Leeds concerning the
church of Preston, in Kent. Although the entry is fragmentary, it appears
that John prevailed.1 92 Three years later we find John bringing a writ of
right against the abbot concerning the advowson of the same church; the
abbot elected the grand assize. 1 93 It seems that John was not satisfied with
the judgment awarding him the next presentation, and wanted to settle the
188. Glanvill, XIII, 20, p. 161.
189. Id. IV, II (trans. Hall).

190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. (trans. Hall).
Id.
1 CRR 175 (Trin. 1200).
2 CRR 157 (Hil. 1203).
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matter once and for all by writ of right.
Although the same person might be plaintiff in both the assize and
the subsequent writ of right, it was more common for the parties to be
reversed, since the party who prevailed at the assize had more to lose by
bringing a subsequent suit. In Michaelmas term 1200, for example, John
of Langdon brought an assize of darrein presentment against Robert of
Sutton and Alberic de Ver. The jurors reported that Payn de Schenefeld
presented the last parson, and Robert responded that the church was in
that land which he held of John, son of Payn. Seisin was awarded to
Robert.194 Two years later we find John back in court, suing Robert by
writ of right.195 The assize only settled the question of the last presentation, and John could pursue the matter further by claiming his right. Other
examples can be cited where the parties are reversed in the subsequent
action of right. 196 Being the loser in a darrein presentment action did not
necessarily end the story, but in most cases the issue of the last presentation was decided first.
The double process afforded by the assize of darrein presentment
and the writ of right calls to mind the Roman law double process by possessory interdicts and rei vindicatio. Just as the party who had possession
at the time of the lawsuit prevailed at utrubi or uti possidetis, so did the
party who had presented the most recent parson prevail at the assize of
darrein presentment. If the defendant conceded that the plaintiff presented
197
the last parson, it was irrelevant whether the presentation was unjust, as
with the interdicts. Once the issue of seisin was decided, the losing party
had recourse to the writ of right, but in the meantime the party who prevailed in the darrein presentment action could have a suitable candidate
instituted as parson. It was better to be in seisin than to be the plaintiff in
an action of right.
Unlike land, advowsons were not held "of' a lord. The patron held
the advowson in his own right and did not owe any feudal service with
respect to it. Lawsuits over advowsons were not "upward-looking" or
"downward-looking"-they had a horizontal dimension. Double process
in the advowson context, therefore, cannot be explained as reflecting a
feudal framework.
Despite the basic similarity between the interaction of the English
194. 1 CRR 332 (Mich. 1200).

195. 2 CRR 113 (Mich. 1202), 223, 236 (Pas. 1203).
196. See, e.g., (a) 12 CRR 289 #1423 (Mich. 1225) = 3 BNB 531 #1685 (the assize), and
13 CRR 6 #26 (Pas. 1227) = 2 BNB 201 #248 (the writ of right, with the parties reversed);

(b) 13 CRR 377 #1799 (Pas. 1229) (defendant in action of right refers to earlier, successful
darrein presentment action brought by his father).
197. When the defendant argued that a church was not vacant, it was a permissible
response for the plaintiff to say that the current parson was admitted unjustly and over his
appeal. See 3 BNB #1352, p. 328 (Mich. 1217); 3 BNB #1354, p. 330 (Mich. 1217). If the
defendant conceded the plaintiff's presentation, however, it was immaterial whether the presentation was unjust. See I I CRR #1662, p. 331 (Trin. 1224) (defendant concedes that the
plaintiff presented the last parson, but says the presentation was unjust; summary judgment
for plaintiff).
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advowson writs and Roman double process, one can also point to ways in
which the advowson writs were different. One possible counterargument
derives from the fact that a donee, who did not have seisin, was able to
block the assize of darrein presentment by asserting his gift.198 This might
suggest that darrein presentment was not a wholly possessory action. Yet
the defense applied only when there was some connection between the
plaintiff and the donor, and it seems to have been designed primarily to
remedy the injustice that would result if the plaintiff was allowed to repudiate an ancestor's charter yet at the same time recover the advowson on the
basis of that ancestor's presentation. Granting the donee a defense when the
plaintiff was the heir of the donor simply allowed the donee to compel the
completion of the gift. Such a defense did not mean that the donee had a
claim to ownership or that there was a proprietary component to the assize.
The limited nature of the defense of gift is reinforced by what might
be termed the rule of subsequent presentation. By the operation of this
rule, when a person gives an advowson away, but afterward (before the
donee has a chance to present) presents another clerk to the bishop who is
instituted as parson, the gift of the advowson is null and void by virtue of
the donor's subsequent presentation.
One of the earliest examples of a subsequent presentation argument
in the rolls dates to Trinity Term 1200 and involves an assize of darrein
presentment. In the case, Robert de Curci sued Roger de Scures concerning the advowson of Farlington, in Hampshire. Roger responded that
Robert de Curci, Robert's uncle, gave a moiety of the vill of Farlington
with appurtenances to his father William fitz Walter and a moiety to his
uncle Roger fitz Walter, and that Roger was the heir of both. Roger conceded that the plaintiff's uncle presented the last parson, but asserted that
the gift followed that presentation. Robert's attorney initially responded
that he was not summoned concerning the charters and should not have to
respond to them. When the court directed Robert's attorney to respond, he
said that after Robert's charters were made, William de Curci father of
Robert presented the last parson, Andrew, and put himself on the jury
concerning that presentation. The court decided to call a jury to determine
whether William de Curci presented the last parson. The jury's verdict is
not recorded. 199
The case between Robert and Roger is distinctive in that the parties
disagreed not only on whether the last presentation occurred before or
after the gift, but on who made the last presentation, Robert's uncle or
Robert's father. In the paradigmatic subsequent presentation dispute, both
parties agree on who presented the last parson, and the sole issue is when
198. Queri autem potest ab initio utrum aliquid dici possit quare assisa illa remanere
debeat. Et potest quidem ad hoc dici, scilicettenentem ipsum concedere antecessoren petentis ultimam inde fecisse presentationemsicut uerun dominum et primogenitum hereden, sed
postea feodum illud ex quo pendet aduocatio ei uel antecessoribus suis contulisse aliquo
uero titulo; et ita eo ipso renanet assisa, et placitum super exceptione ipso inter ipsos litigantes deinde esse potent. Glanvill XIII, 20, pp. 161-62.
199. 1 CRR 239 (Trin. 1200).
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that presentation occurred. A 1212 dispute between Agnes de Roche and
the abbot of Beaulieu is typical. Agnes brought an assize of darrein presentment against the abbot concerning the church of Fenstanton,
Huntingdonshire. The abbot's attorney responded that Roland de Dinan
presented the last parson, a certain Richard. Agnes acknowledged this and
said that the land and advowson descended from him to Derian her late
husband. The abbot's attorney then alleged that, after Roland made that
presentation, he gave the church to the abbey; a charter was offered.
Agnes replied that, after Roland made that charter, if he ever did, he presented a parson who was admitted at Roland's presentation. The abbot
said that Richard was parson for days and years before the charter was
made. Both parties put themselves on the jury, and the jurors said that
was
Roland gave the church (i.e., presented a parson) after the charter
200
made. Agnes was awarded her seisin and the abbot was amerced.
The rule of subsequent presentation was invoked most frequently in
assizes of darrein presentment, and it is quite possible that the rule was
first developed in that context. The rule is understandable if one assumes
that the donee originally had neither ownership nor possession, but something like an in personam claim, which could be invoked against the
donor or his heir provided that there had been no revocation of the gift.
This does not mean that the assize of darrein presentment was really
meant to decide right rather than seisin.
The defense of gift, therefore, does not meaningfully distinguish the
assize of darrein presentment from the Roman interdicts. But there are
other important differences. First, while the primary purpose of the interdict uti possidetis was to set the stage for a subsequent rei vindicatio, the
assize of darrein presentment settled an urgent question about the next
presentation, and was not necessarily followed by a dispute about the
right. The cases cited above, 201 in which a darrein presentment action was
202
followed by a writ of right, may be the exception rather than the rule. A
disnovel
of
assize
to
the
regard
with
similar argument has been made
203
seisin, which was not usually followed by an action of right, and it may
apply equally well here. If one accepts the theory that the assize of darrein
presentment was invented in response to the Third Lateran Council, then
the assize might have been intended primarily as a substitute for, and not
a complement to, the writ of right. Even if litigants disappointed in darrein presentment actions did not always avail themselves of the writ of
right, however, the fact remains that they could if they wished.
One can point to other ways in which the assize of darrein presentment differed from the interdict uti possidetis.The assize, unlike the interdict, did not prevent the use of force, and one party in the assize was
clearly plaintiff and the other clearly defendant, in contradistinction to the
200. 6CRR 190-91 (Hil. 1212).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 192-195.
202. Although I have not done a formal count, my estimation is that most cases of darrein
presentment were not followed by an action of right.
203. RICHARDSON & SAYLES, supra note 85, at cxxix.
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interdict. Nor did the assize include the interdict's requirement that possession be nec vi nec clam nec precario,although there was a requirement

that the presentation have been made in time of peace, and that might be
seen as analogous. 204 But perhaps the most telling difference is that the
text of the assize does not refer to either seisin or possession, and does not
borrow the vocabulary from or follow the phrasing of the interdict, which
uses the verb "to possess" twice.2 05 One would expect a remedy modeled
on Roman law to be framed in a similar way as the Roman remedy that
inspired it, at least as regards the basic concept of possession. If the king's
advisers were attempting to replicate the Roman interdict, they knew how
to cover their tracks.
The writ of right of advowson also departs significantly from Roman
proprietary ideas. In cases brought by this writ, the justices frequently held
that it was not possible to acquire right by transfer without presenting a
candidate. Only a presentation in the past would entitle a plaintiff to bring
the writ of right, for one could not sue on the basis of "another's right
given to one by charter and not one's own right." 206 Roman law acknowledged the acquisition of ownership by delivery, provided that there was a
sufficient causa, such as gift, dowry, or sale. 207 One might expect that, if
the writ of right of advowson had been modeled on the Roman rei vindicatio, the justices would have treated delivery of the charter of gift as a transfer of ownership and allowed the donees to bring the writ. In any event,
because the writ of right predates the assize of darrein presentment, it was
clearly not originally conceived as part of a double process.
Having the right to an advowson meant that one or one's ancestors
had presented a candidate at a specified point in the past, possibly many
years ago. Having seisin, by contrast, meant having made the last presentation. The distinction was not absolute: it was a matter of degree. Thus,
the English concepts of right and seisin cannot be treated as literal equivalents of Roman ownership and possession. Sutherland aptly summarized
the difference between English right and seisin and Roman ownership and
possession when he noted that the Roman terms "were distinct juridical
concepts with no middle ground between them, while seisin and right...
were reference points in a continuum: the more recent and notorious facts,
the relatively older and less well-known facts." 208
204. The tempore pacis requirement appears in Glanvill IV, I, p. 44, but not XIII, 19, p.
161, which suggests either that XIII was completed before IV or that there was a clerical
error in XIII.
205. Ait praetor: 'Uti eas aedes, quibus de agitur, nec vi nec clam nec precario alter ab
alteropossidetis,quo minus ita possideatis,vim fieri veto.' D. 43.17.1 .pr. (LP 8.14).

206. This rule is stated plainly in 2 CRR 173 (Hil. 1203) ("alteriusjus per cartam sibi
datam et non suumjusproprium.");see also II CRR no. 121, p. 21 = 3 BNB no. 1578, p.
457 (Hil. 1223) (plaintiff amerced because "loquitur de alieno iure et alterius seisina quam

antecessorum suorum"). The rule was not always applied in practice, however. See I CRR
471 (Pas. 1201) (plaintiff allowed to bring writ of right on basis of gift); 4 CRR 126 (Pas.
1206) (same); 2 BNB no. 39, pp. 33-35 (Pas.-Trin. 1219) (same).
207. Inst. 2.1.41.
208. SUTHERLAND, supra note 18, at 41-42.
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The fact remains, however, that the assize of darrein presentment
introduced the possibility of something close to double process in the
advowson context, and the scheme in Glanvill would not have struck a contemporary canonist or Romanist as peculiar. The two basic features of
Roman and canon law mentioned in Part li-separate remedies for ownership and possession and the idea that possession should be determined
first-can arguably be seen in the English common law of advowsons,
although the form they took there is different from the form they took in the
ius commune. While it would be a stretch to assume that the royal advisers
consulted books or teachers of Roman law in designing the English legal
system, it is likely that at least some of the men responsible for the advowson writs knew about the sort of actions that were being heard in ecclesiastical courts at the time. The basic distinction between proprietasand possessio can arguably be seen in the advowson writs, translated into terms that
Englishmen understood and brought into harmony with English ideas.
CONCLUSION
Looking only at the writs concerning land, it is difficult to say with
any sort of definitiveness that the early common law distinguished
between ownership and possession. If Milsom is right about the tenurial
dimension of the writ of right for land and the assize of novel disseisin,
then these two actions cannot be said to reflect Roman or canon law influence. Any resemblance to Roman law must be accidental. But the fact that
concepts of ownership and possession can arguably be seen in the advowson writs cannot be explained away so easily. The advowson writs do not
involve upward-looking or downward-looking claims: they do not follow
any tenurial direction. Once the scheme as a whole is considered, the possibility of influence becomes more real.
Taken as a whole, the early common law of property seems to incorporate ideas of ownership and possession. The resemblances between the
assizes of novel disseisin and darrein presentment and the Roman interdicts are too strong to be ignored. Even so, the common law did not
"receive" Roman ideas in the same the way its sister legal systems did on
the Continent. English right and seisin were not interchangeable with
Roman ownership and possession.
In the end, the question of whether Roman and canon law influenced
the early common law of property depends on how one defines influence.
If influence means borrowing the specific tools of another legal system and
transplanting them into a different context, then it is unlikely that sort of
influence occurred here. On the other hand, if influence can mean drawing
on a concept from one system and building a new framework that departed
in significant ways from the original system, then it is entirely possible that
some such influence occurred in this context. The royal advisers may not
209
have borrowed Roman answers for English questions, but it is unlikely
that they answered those questions in an intellectual vacuum.
209. MILSOM, supra note 15, at 2.

